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I. Summary of the dissertation 
 
The theory of the extended mind (put forward by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in 
1998) is in the focus of my dissertation. The paper has given rise to one of the most heated 
debates in contemporary philosophy of mind, and for good reasons. It posits a challenge to 
the models of traditional cognitive science, the prevailing philosophical concepts of mind and 
even to our everyday thinking about ourselves. It also has a distinct metaphysical bite, 
claiming that cognitive processes (sometimes) can take place outside of the head.  
My dissertation analyses and defends the original theory of the extended mind 
hypothesis, but its ultimate aim is to go beyond the hypothesis, and extend the already 
extended mind a bit further. I argue that we have good reasons to do so. In this way, the 
extended mind framework can cover cases where the mind is not augmented by different 
props of its environment, but the environment “leaks” into the mind causing all kinds of 
drastic and, more importantly, cognitive changes inside. These processes, just like the ones 
considered by Clark and Chalmers, deserve cognitive credit. The deeply intertwined nature of 
mind and world (especially our social and cultural worlds) makes it possible or even 
necessary to think about them with much less definite boundaries between them. Therefore, I 
explore and argue for two potential directions the extended mind theory could take us.  
In order to achieve these goals, the original criteria by which Clark and Chalmers 
imagine extended systems need to be modified. The new types of “cognitive coupling” not 
only follow from the logic and spirit of Clark and Chalmers’ original work, but there is also 
empirical evidence from the sciences of mind and behaviour to support them. By citing some 
of the evidence, I argue that a socially and culturally extended mind is just as plausible a 
notion as the original extended mind; what is more, it accounts for a very important aspect of 
human cognition. 
 
 
II. Central claims and theses 
 
 The extended mind hypothesis raises a stark dilemma: given certain assumptions, 
‟mind” will either be too narrow or too extended.  
 The extended version, albeit prima facie more counter-intuitive, upon closer scrutiny 
proves to be more plausible.  
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 The “Extended Mind” can be defended against its counter-arguments. 
 With a small, albeit important change in the criteria by which we conceptualise 
cognitive coupling, at least two other “extensions” can be outlined. These lead to 
socially and culturally extended minds. Such extensions can be supported by 
empirical evidence.  
 The social and cultural external elements are not only parts of cognition, but 
oftentimes play much more important roles in driving cognition than the internal 
elements do.  
 A “global mind” follows from the original notion, which, although does not seem 
plausible at first glance, is a genuine theoretical possibility and might even have social 
psychological bases to be actualised. 
 
 
III. Structure of the dissertation 
 
1. The context 
I outline the context in which the extended mind hypothesis is articulated. This 
context is twofold: first, there is the traditional, prevailing “Cartesian” model of mind, which 
culminates in Jerry Fodor’s methodological solipsism and his theory of the modular mind. I 
refer to arguments adduced in the literature, and demonstrate that this conception of mind is 
untenable.  
Second, I showcase concepts of the mind that go against this Cartesian conception. 
These are the “4E’s”: Enactive, Embodied, Embedded and Extended Mind. The extended 
mind is the most extreme of these, as it assumes that external elements of the world play a 
constitutive role in cognition. 
 
2. The original notion 
I present Clark and Chalmers’ original argument, review the most crucial counter-arguments 
found in the literature of the extended mind hypothesis, and demonstrate that they are not 
only inconclusive but also improbable. I especially focus on three important aspects: (a) the 
parity principle, the function of which leads to many misunderstandings in the literature; (b) 
the two sets of criteria that constitute cognitive coupling, one of which proves to be ad hoc 
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and in need to be dismissed entirely; (c) the separation of two distinct “waves” of extended 
mind arguments, one of which focuses on the parity of inner and outer processes, second of 
which is more interested in how the inner and outer realms complement each other. 
 
3. The dilemma 
I argue why and how Clark and Chalmers’ line of thought leads to the dilemma of “too 
narrow” or “too extended” minds. The problem is, standing beliefs or unconscious processes, 
which are undoubtedly mental, play very similar or often the same functional roles as 
reminders in a notebook or other props of the environment which augment cognition. We 
have no clear criteria to demarcate the mental from the non-mental. If we say that the 
notebook is not part of the mind, because it is not conscious, it does not have phenomenal 
character, it is not the locus of control (or for some other reason), then we claim that these are 
the marks of the mental. But we can always find internal states and processes that are not 
conscious, that do not have phenomenal character, or have nothing to do with control (etc.). 
Moreover, most of our mental states and processes have nothing to do with these. If we still 
claim that these are the marks of the mental, we have made the mind “too narrow”, since 
most of the internal states and processes will not constitute our minds. 
On the other hand, if we accept a notebook as a genuine part of cognition, it is hard to see 
where our minds end. Why stop with a notebook? What about computers, calculators, 
libraries, the internet, other people and so on? These examples demonstrate the case when the 
mind is “too extended”. 
Whichever we choose, the revision of our notions of mind becomes inevitable. In the 
dissertation I argue that the latter is a more plausible option, however strange it seems prima 
facie. 
 
4. The modification 
I present a critique of Clark’s and Chalmers’s notion of cognitive coupling and propose a 
minor, but important modification in their set of criteria. This opens up the original 
framework to other cognitive extensions, where external elements play a more important role 
in leading cognitive processes. 
 
5. Social coupling 
Scientific results from the field of social psychology suggest that our cognitive architectures 
are often fundamentally changed and influenced by our social interactions with others. These 
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interactions are so deep that some thinkers consider the human race to be a “superorganism” 
(like bees and ants); I do not go this far, but I argue that we have such psychological 
tendencies, which more often than not, demonstrate the impossibility of theoretically 
separating the internal mind and the external social world, and hence they should be treated 
as a single dynamic system.  
In this part of the dissertation I also draw parallels between the Extended Mind and some 
aspects of Heidegger’s thinking in order to show how invisible, yet frequent and drastic these 
“social couplings” can be. 
 
6. Transformative coupling 
Scientific results from the field of cultural psychology and anthropology suggest that our 
cognitive processes are fundamentally dependent on the cultures we live in: that they change 
not only what we think about, but also how we think. The prevailing paradigm, which treats 
human cognition as fixed by biology and therefore universal, becomes more and more 
problematic in the light of new results. And since there does not seem to be a “Cartesian 
cognitive atom” that is the same everywhere, the mind should be conceptualised in such a 
way as to account for its closest, transformative external elements.   
And since the framework I develop takes these external elements to be parts of the mind, the 
analysis of these external elements is also necessary to give a satisfactory description of the 
mind. I use insights of Karl Popper and thinkers of memetics to show that our cultural worlds 
have a sort of autonomy, from which it also follows that our thoughts and thought processes 
are mostly not our own. Hence, a very significant part of our minds reside in the outside 
world.  
 
7. Global Mind 
Once we let a single notebook into the mental realm, as Clark and Chalmers do, the mind 
might seem to “overextend”. The culmination of this overextension could be grasped by the 
concept of a global mind. I argue that such a concept is not less plausible than the one put 
forward by Clark and Chalmers. And since we have superorganismic tendencies (a topic I 
discuss when I explicate social coupling), this might well be a non-actualised, yet genuine 
possibility. 
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IV. Methodology 
Apart from abstract analyses, thought experiments, philosophical arguments – the standard 
toolkit of the philosopher –, I also use examples, analogies, metaphors and labels in order to 
make my argument as clear and convincing (and even as entertaining) as possible. I also use 
empirical results from different fields of the scientific study of the mind and human 
behaviour. The use of these results is justified by the fact that either other philosophers also 
rely on them in the literature, or are in line with such results.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The argument of the dissertation is far from conclusive. Its virtue and (somewhat) novelty 
lies in that it systematically separates different types of cognitive coupling, introduces social 
extension and explicates cultural extension (which is known in the Extended Mind literature, 
but is not fully explicated). This taxonomy might help the reader to see previously hidden 
theoretical assumptions and consequences of Clark’s and Chalmers’ original hypothesis more 
clearly. It might also help us make up our minds about our minds.  
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